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Abstract
Let G = (A ∪B, E) be a bipartite graph on n vertices where every vertex ranks its neighbors in a
strict order of preference. A matching M in G is popular if there is no matching N such that vertices
that prefer N to M outnumber those that prefer M to N . Popular matchings always exist in G
since every stable matching is popular. Thus it is easy to find a popular matching in G – however it
is NP-hard to compute a min-cost popular matching in G when there is a cost function on the edge
set; moreover it is NP-hard to approximate this to any multiplicative factor. An O∗(2n) algorithm
to compute a min-cost popular matching in G follows from known results. Here we show:
an algorithm with running time O∗(2n/4) ≈ O∗(1.19n) to compute a min-cost popular matching;
assume all edge costs are non-negative – then given ε > 0, a randomized algorithm with running
time poly(n, 1
ε
) to compute a matching M such that cost(M) is at most twice the optimal cost
and with high probability, the fraction of all matchings more popular than M is at most 12 + ε.
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1 Introduction
Consider a matching problem in a bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B,E) on n vertices where
every vertex has a strict ranking of its neighbors. Matching M is stable if M admits no
blocking edge – an edge (a, b) is a blocking edge to M if a and b prefer each other to their
respective assignments in M . Stable matchings always exist in G and one such matching can
be computed in linear time by the classical Gale-Shapley algorithm [14]. Suppose there is a
cost function on the edge set E. Computing a min-cost stable matching in G is a well-studied
problem and there are several polynomial time algorithms to compute a min-cost stable
matching and special variants of this problem [10, 11, 12, 21, 29, 30, 31].
Stability or absence of blocking edges is a rather strict notion – it is known that all stable
matchings have the same size and match the same subset of vertices [15]. Consider the instance
G = (A ∪ B,E) where A = {a1, a2}, B = {b1, b2}, and E = {(a1, b1), (a1, b2), (a2, b1)}.
Suppose a1 prefers b1 to b2 and similarly, b1 prefers a1 to a2. The only stable matching here
is {(a1, b1)} whose size is half the size of the perfect matching {(a1, b2), (a2, b1)}.
A relaxation. In applications such as matching students to advisers, we would like to
replace the notion of “no blocking edges” with a more relaxed notion of stability for the
sake of obtaining a larger matching, or more generally, a more optimal matching. A natural
relaxation of stability is the notion of popularity introduced by Gärdenfors [16] in 1975.
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Roughly speaking, a matching is popular if there is no matching that makes more vertices
happier. More formally, we say a vertex u ∈ A ∪ B prefers matching M to matching N if
either (i) u is matched in M and unmatched in N or (ii) u is matched in both M and N
and u prefers its partner in M to its partner in N . For any two matchings M and N , let
φ(M,N) be the number of vertices that prefer M to N .
I Definition 1. A matching M is popular if φ(M,N) ≥ φ(N,M) for every matching N in
G, i.e., ∆(M,N) ≥ 0 where ∆(M,N) = φ(M,N)− φ(N,M).
In an election betweenM and N where vertices cast votes, φ(M,N) is the number of votes
for M and φ(N,M) is the number of votes for N . A popular matching never loses an election
against another matching: thus it is a weak Condorcet winner [3, 4] in the corresponding
voting instance. Although (weak) Condorcet winners need not exist in a general voting
instance, popular matchings always exist in a bipartite graph since every stable matching is
popular [16]. In fact, a stable matching is a min-size popular matching [19]. In the example
described earlier, the perfect matching {(a1, b2), (a2, b1)} is unstable but popular.
Efficient algorithms are known to compute a max-size popular matching in G [19, 23].
Though computing a min-size/max-size popular matching is easy, surprisingly, it is NP-hard
to decide if G admits a popular matching that is not a min-size/max-size popular matching [9].
Also, computing a min-cost popular matching is NP-hard [9] when there is a cost function on
the edge set. The min-cost popular matching problem includes other optimization problems
such as computing a popular matching with forced/forbidden edges or one with max-utility
as special cases and these variants are also NP-hard [9].
In applications such as matching students to advisers or medical residents to hospitals,
where matchings have a long-term impact, it may be worthwhile to spend (exponential) time
and compute an optimal popular matching in G. It follows from recent work on finding
popular matchings in non-bipartite graphs [25] that there is an O∗(2n) time algorithm for
the min-cost popular matching problem in a bipartite graph on n vertices (note that O∗(2n)
stands for O(2n ·poly(n))). Here we study faster exponential time algorithms for this problem
and show the following result.
I Theorem 2. Given a bipartite graph G = (A ∪B,E) on n vertices where every vertex has
a strict preference list ranking its neighbors and a function cost : E → R, a min-cost popular
matching in G can be computed in O∗(2n/4) ≈ O∗(1.19n) time.
The running time of our algorithm is O(2p · poly(n)) where p is the number of connected
components of size at least 4 in a special subgraph of G. Thus our algorithm is an FPT
algorithm parameterized by p and when p = O(logn), this is a polynomial time algorithm.
When edge costs are non-negative, the max-cost popular matching problem in G admits
an efficient 1/2-approximation algorithm – however the min-cost popular matching problem
is NP-hard to approximate within any multiplicative factor even when edge costs are in
{0, 1} [9]. This motivates the following question: when edge costs are non-negative, is there
an efficient algorithm to compute an approximately popular matching whose cost is O(opt),
where opt is the cost of a min-cost popular matching?
There are several ways to define an approximately popular matching and we choose the
following novel definition: a matching M such that φ(M,N) ≥ φ(N,M) for a majority of
matchings N in G. This motivates the definition of a semi-popular matching as follows.
I Definition 3. Call a matching M in G = (A ∪B,E) semi-popular if φ(M,N) ≥ φ(N,M)
for at least half the matchings N in G.
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Though semi-popularity is a natural relaxation of popularity, the set of semi-popular
matchings seems to lack the structure of the set of popular matchings. We do not know how
to efficiently test if a given matching is semi-popular or not. We show the following result on
computing an almost semi-popular matching in an instance G with non-negative edge costs.
I Theorem 4. Given a bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B,E) with cost : E → R≥0 and ε > 0, a
matching M can be computed in poly(n, 1ε ) time such that cost(M) ≤ 2opt and with high
probability M is undefeated by at least 1/2− ε fraction of all matchings in G.
Using the notation of bi-criteria approximation algorithms (see [27]), the above result is
with high probability a (2, 12 − ε) approximation of a min-cost popular matching, where the
first coordinate is the ratio of the cost of our matching and opt and the second coordinate
is a measure of popularity of our matching, more precisely, it is the fraction of matchings
in G that our matching does not lose to. Designing an efficient algorithm to compute an
(O(1), 1− ε) bi-criteria approximation is an open problem.
1.1 Background and Related Results
Algorithmic questions in the domain of popular matchings have been studied in the last
10-15 years. We refer to [5] for a survey. Initially, algorithms for popular matchings in
instances with one-sided preferences (only vertices in A have preferences) were studied [1].
In the domain of two-sided preferences with ties, it is NP-complete to decide if popular
matchings exist or not [2, 6]. The problem of deciding if a non-bipartite graph with strict
preferences admits a popular matching is NP-complete [9, 17]. Popular matchings always
exist in bipartite graphs with strict preferences [16]. However, as mentioned earlier, it is
NP-hard to compute or approximate a min-cost popular matching. In order to cope with this
hardness of approximation, a relaxation of popularity called quasi-popularity was considered
in [8].
A matching M is quasi-popular if φ(N,M) ≤ 2 · φ(M,N) for all matchings N . That is,
M may lose many elections, however the factor of defeat, i.e., the ratio of number of votes
won by the rival matching and the number of votes won by M , is bounded by 2. On the
other hand, a semi-popular matching does not lose too many elections. A polynomial time
algorithm to compute a quasi-popular matching of cost at most opt was given in [8].
There is a vast literature on fast exponential time algorithms for NP-hard problems
and we refer to the book [13] on this subject. An algorithm with running time O∗(cn),
where c = O(1), was given in [25] to decide if a non-bipartite graph on n vertices with strict
preferences has a popular matching or not. Fast exponential time algorithms for other hard
problems in matchings under preferences are also known, e.g., the sex-equal stable marriage
problem in bipartite graphs where the objective is to find a fair stable matching – a fast
exponential time algorithm is known for this problem when the length of preference lists of
vertices on one side of the bipartite graph is bounded from above by a small value [28].
1.2 Techniques
An O∗(2n) time algorithm was given in [25] to decide if a special popular matching called
a truly popular matching exists or not in a general graph (not necessarily bipartite) on
n vertices. A truly popular matching is a matching that is popular fractional (defined in
Section 4). In bipartite graphs, every popular matching is truly popular and so this algorithm
leads to an algorithm with running time O∗(2n) to compute a min-cost popular matching
in the bipartite graph G. Our faster exponential time algorithm is an extension of this
algorithm.
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The earlier algorithm. The O∗(2n) time algorithm uses dual certificates or witnesses for
popular matchings, where a witness ~α is a vector in {0,±1}n that obeys certain constraints
(see Theorem 5). Corresponding to each of the 2n parity combinations – whether αu is
0 or ±1 for each vertex u – the O∗(2n) algorithm constructs a stable matching instance
and shows that every stable matching in this instance that avoids certain edges maps to a
popular matching in G. Conversely, every popular matching in G can be realized as a stable
matching that avoids certain edges in one of these 2n instances. Computing a min-cost stable
matching that excludes certain edges in each of these 2n instances and taking the least cost
such matching leads us to a min-cost popular matching in G.
Our faster algorithm. It was shown in [8] that all vertices in the same connected component
in a subgraph G0 of G called its “popular subgraph” have the same parity of their α-values.
So instead of considering individual vertices, we consider non-trivial connected components
in G0 as our “units”. Our main idea is that it suffices for the algorithm to go through parity
combinations of α-values only for connected components in G0 of size at least 4. So our
algorithm constructs at most 2n/4 stable matching instances. However our stable matching
instances are more elaborate than in the earlier algorithm and the most technical part of the
analysis is the proof that stable matchings that avoid certain edges in such an instance map
to popular matchings in G. The algorithm and its proof of correctness are given in Section 3.
Our bi-criteria approximation algorithm. Unlike the popular matching polytope, the pop-
ular fractional matching polytope has a compact extended formulation [26]. Thus a min-cost
popular fractional matching can be computed in polynomial time by linear programming
over this polytope. It is known that this polytope is half-integral [20]. Thus we can efficiently
find two matchings M1,M2 in G such that (IM1 + IM2)/2 is a min-cost popular fractional
matching in G, where IM is the edge incidence vector of matching M . This implies that one
of M1,M2 is semi-popular.
Interestingly, we do not know how to efficiently decide which of M1,M2 is semi-popular.
We use the random sampler from [22] to sample matchings from a distribution close to the
uniform distribution – this allows us to decide with high probability whether both M1 and
M2 are almost semi-popular or one of them is not. This result is given in Section 4.
2 Popular Matchings and Witnesses
Let G̃ be the graph G augmented with self-loops. We assume that each vertex is its own last
choice neighbor. Any matching M in G can henceforth be regarded as a perfect matching M̃
in G̃ by adding self-loops for all vertices left unmatched in M . The following edge weight
function wtM in G̃ will be useful to us. For any edge (a, b) in G, define:
wtM (a, b) =

2 if (a, b) is a blocking edge to M ;
−2 if both a and b prefer their respective partners in M to each other;
0 otherwise.
So wtM (e) = 0 for every edge e ∈ M . We need to define wtM on self-loops also.
For any vertex u ∈ A ∪ B, let wtM (u, u) = 0 if (u, u) ∈ M̃ , else wtM (u, u) = −1. Let




wtM (e) = φ(N,M)− φ(M,N) = ∆(N,M).
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Hence M is popular in G if and only if every perfect matching in the graph G̃ (with edge
weights given by wtM ) has weight at most 0. Consider the max-weight perfect matching LP in
the graph G̃: this is (LP1) given below in variables xe for e ∈ Ẽ. Here δ̃(u) = δ(u)∪ {(u, u)}








xe = 1 ∀u ∈ A ∪B





s.t. αa + αb ≥ wtM (a, b) ∀ (a, b) ∈ E
αu ≥ wtM (u, u) ∀u ∈ A ∪B
The characterization of popular matchings given in Theorem 5 follows from LP-duality
and total unimodularity of the system. Recall that |A ∪B| = n.
I Theorem 5 ([24, 26]). A matching M in G = (A ∪B,E) is popular if and only if there
exists a vector ~α ∈ {0,±1}n such that
∑
u∈A∪B αu = 0,
αa + αb ≥ wtM (a, b) ∀ (a, b) ∈ E and αu ≥ wtM (u, u) ∀u ∈ A ∪B.
Proof. The linear program (LP2) admits an optimal solution that is integral since its
constraint matrix is totally unimodular. The vector ~α is an integral optimal solution of
(LP2). We have αu ≥ wtM (u, u) ≥ −1 for all u.
Since M̃ is an optimal solution to (LP1), complementary slackness implies αu + αv =
wtM (u, v) = 0 for each edge (u, v) ∈ M . Thus αu = −αv ≤ 1 for every vertex u matched
to a non-trivial neighbor v in M . Regarding any vertex u such that (u, u) ∈ M̃ , we have
αu = wtM (u, u) = 0 (by complementary slackness). Hence ~α ∈ {0,±1}n. J
I Definition 6. For any popular matching M , a vector ~α ∈ {0,±1}n as given in Theorem 5
is called a witness of M .
A popular matching may have several witnesses. A stable matching S has ~0 as a witness,
since wtS(e) ≤ 0 for all edges e in G̃. Call an edge e in G = (A ∪B,E) popular if there is
some popular matching in G that contains e. Let E0 be the set of popular edges in G. The
set E0 can be computed in linear time [7]. Call the subgraph G0 = (A ∪B,E0) the popular
subgraph of G. The following property will be very useful.
I Lemma 7 ([8]). Let M be any popular matching in G and let ~α be any witness of M . In
any connected component C in the popular subgraph G0: either (i) αu = 0 for all u ∈ C or
(ii) αu ∈ {±1} for all u ∈ C.
Proof. Consider any popular edge (a, b). So there is some popular matching N that contains
(a, b). Since wtM (Ñ) = ∆(N,M) = 0 (because M and N are popular matchings), Ñ is an
optimal solution to (LP1). We know that ~α is an optimal solution to (LP2). So it follows
from complementary slackness that αa +αb = wtM (a, b). Since wtM (a, b) ∈ {±2, 0} (an even
number), the integers αa and αb have the same parity.
Let u and v be any 2 vertices in the same connected component in the popular subgraph
G0. So there is a u-v path ρ in G such that every edge in ρ is a popular edge. We have just
seen that the endpoints of each popular edge have the same parity in ~α. Hence αu and αv
have the same parity. Thus either αu = 0 for all u ∈ C or αu ∈ {±1} for all u ∈ C. J
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3 A fast exponential time algorithm for min-cost popular matching
Let C1, . . . , Cr be the connected components in the popular subgraph G0. Assume C1, . . . , Cq
are the non-trivial components, i.e., |Ci| ≥ 2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ q and |Ci| = 1 for q + 1 ≤ i ≤ r.
So each of Cq+1, . . . , Cr consists of a single vertex that is left unmatched in all popular
matchings in G. Call such a vertex unpopular. Let U be the set of unpopular vertices. The
following two observations will be useful.
I Observation 1. Let M be a popular matching with ~α as a witness. If u ∈ U then αu = 0.
Proof. Since M leaves u unmatched, the self-loop (u, u) ∈ M̃ . Observe that M̃ is an optimal
solution to (LP1) and ~α is an optimal solution to (LP2). So αu = wtM (u, u) = 0 by
complementary slackness. C
I Observation 2. Every non-trivial component C in the popular subgraph G0 has an even
number of vertices.
Proof. All max-size popular matchings in G leave the same vertices unmatched and these
unmatched vertices are unpopular [18]. Thus a max-size popular matching M restricted
to every non-trivial component C in G0 is perfect, i.e., all vertices in C are matched in M .
Hence |C| is even. C
Let C1, . . . , Cp be the components in G0 of size greater than 2. This means |Ci| ≥ 4 for
i ∈ [p] (by Observation 2). So Cp+1, . . . , Cq are the components in G0 of size exactly 2.
For every subset I ⊆ {1, . . . , p}, our algorithm builds a corresponding graph GI . Among
all stable matchings in GI that satisfy certain constraints, our algorithm finds a min-cost
matching (call it NI). It will be shown that among all subsets I ⊆ [p], the matching NI with
the least cost will map to a min-cost popular matching in G.
The new instance GI . Let I ⊆ [p]. Partition the vertices in A ∪B into three subsets:
S0 = ∪i∈ICi ∪ U, S1 = ∪i∈[p]\ICi, and S2 = ∪qi=p+1Ci.
Our goal is to build GI such that all popular matchings in G that admit witnesses ~α
where αu = 0 for u ∈ S0 and αu ∈ {±1} for u ∈ S1 become stable matchings in GI . For
vertices in S2, we do not a priori commit any particular α-value. This is reflected in the
vertex set VI :
VI = {u0 : u ∈ S0 ∪ S2} ∪ {u+, u−, d(u) : u ∈ S1 ∪ S2} ∪ {d′(u) : u ∈ S2}.
The set VI contains a single vertex u0 for every u ∈ S0, three vertices u+, u−, d(u) for
every u ∈ S1, and five vertices u+, u−, u0, d(u), d′(u) for every u ∈ S2. Since the α-value of
every u ∈ S0 is fixed to be 0, we have a unique vertex u0 in GI for each u ∈ S0.
Since the α-value of every u ∈ S1 is either 1 or −1, there are two vertices u+, u− in GI
for each u ∈ S1. However in order to map stable matchings in GI to matchings in G, we
want at most one of u+, u− to be matched in any stable matching in GI : this is achieved by
using a dummy vertex d(u). Preferences will be such that one of u+, u− has to be matched
to d(u) in any stable matching in GI . So every stable matching in GI matches at most one
of u+, u− to a non-dummy neighbor.
Since the α-value of every u ∈ S2 is one of 0,±1, we have three vertices u+, u−, u0 in
GI for each u ∈ S2. However we want at most one of u+, u−, u0 to be matched in any
stable matching in GI and this is achieved by using two dummy vertices d(u) and d′(u).
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Preferences will be such that two of u+, u−, u0 have to be matched to d(u) and d′(u) in any
stable matching in GI . So every stable matching in GI matches at most one of u+, u−, u0 to
a non-dummy neighbor.
The edge set EI of the instance GI is defined as follows. For every (u, v) ∈ E, the edge
set EI consists of one or more of the following edges: (i) (u0, v0), (ii) (u+, v0), (iii) (u0, v+),
(iv) (u−, v+), (v) (u+, v−).
In more detail, let u ∈ A ∪B. Let v be a neighbor of u in G.
if u, v ∈ S0 then (u0, v0) is in EI .
if u ∈ S1 and v ∈ S0 then (u+, v0) is in EI .
if u, v ∈ S1 and u prefers v to every neighbor in S0 then (u−, v+) is in EI .
The edges in GI that correspond to edges (u, v) in G with an endpoint, say u ∈ A ∪B,
in S2 are described below.
let v ∈ S0. If u prefers v to its “popular partner”1 then the edge (u+, v0) ∈ EI ; else the
edge (u0, v0) ∈ EI .
let v ∈ S1. If u prefers v to its popular partner then the edge (u0, v+) ∈ EI . If v prefers
u to every neighbor in S0 then the edge (u+, v−) ∈ EI .
let v ∈ S2. If either v is u’s popular partner or one of u, v prefers the other to its popular
partner2 then the edge (u0, v0) ∈ EI . Moreover, if u prefers v to every neighbor in S0
then the edge (u−, v+) ∈ EI .
For every u ∈ S1: the edges (u+, d(u)) and (u−, d(u)) are in EI . For every u ∈ S2: the
edges (u+, d(u)), (u0, d(u)) and the edges (u0, d′(u)), (u−, d′(u)) are in EI .
Vertex preferences. We will first list preference orders for dummy vertices.
For u ∈ S1: d(u)’s preference order is u+  u−, i.e., top choice u+ followed by u−.
For u ∈ S2: d(u)’s preference order is u+  u0 and d′(u)’s preference order is u0  u−.
Let u ∈ A ∪B. We now list preference orders for u+, u0, and u−. An observation that
will be useful here is that for any two adjacent vertices u, v in G, there is at most one element
in {v0, v+, v−} in the preference list of u+; similarly, in the preference lists of u0 and u−.
1. For u ∈ S0: u0’s preference order among its neighbors in GI is as per u’s preference order
in G, i.e., ignore subscripts of vertices and arrange them as per u’s preference order in G.
2. For u ∈ S1 ∪ S2: u+’s preference order among its neighbors in GI is as per u’s preference
order in G with d(u) as its least preferred neighbor.
3. For u ∈ S1 (resp., u ∈ S2): u−’s preference order among its neighbors in GI is d(u)
(resp., d′(u)) as its top choice neighbor followed by its other neighbors in GI as per u’s
preference order in G.
4. For u ∈ S2: u0’s order among its neighbors in GI is d(u) as its top choice neighbor
followed by its other neighbors in GI as per u’s preference order in G and d′(u) as its
least preferred neighbor.
For (a, b) ∈ E and x, x′ ∈ {0,±}, for every (ax, bx′) ∈ EI , we set cost(ax, bx′) = cost(a, b).
Also, the cost of any edge incident to a dummy vertex is 0.
1 u ∈ S2: so u ∈ Cj where |Cj | = 2; hence all popular matchings in G match u to the same neighbor.
2 Note that both u and v cannot prefer each other to their respective popular partners since that would
make (u, v) a blocking edge to every stable matching in G.
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I Theorem 8. Let M be a popular matching in G = (A∪B,E) with a witness ~α ∈ {0,±1}n
where αv = 0 for v ∈ S0 and αv ∈ {±1} for v ∈ S1. Then there exists a stable matching NI
in GI such that cost(NI) = cost(M) and the following three properties are satisfied:
1. NI avoids all edges between a subscript + vertex and a subscript 0 vertex,
2. NI matches all subscript − vertices, and
3. NI includes q − p edges from the set ∪qi=p+1{(a+, b−), (a0, b0), (a−, b+) : a, b ∈ Ci}.
Proof. M is a popular matching in G = (A ∪B,E) with a witness ~α ∈ {0,±1}n. For any
u ∈ A ∪B, we will define su = +/−/0 corresponding to αu = +1/−1/0, respectively. That
is, (i) αu = 1 implies su = +, (ii) αu = −1 implies su = −, and (iii) αu = 0 implies su = 0.
For u ∈ S1: if su = + then let tu = − else let tu = +.
For u ∈ S2: if su = + then let tu = 0 and t′u = −; if su = 0 then let tu = + and t′u = −;
if su = − then let tu = + and t′u = 0.
Define the set NI as follows:
NI = {(asa , bsb) : (a, b) ∈M} ∪ {(utu , d(u)) : u ∈ S1 ∪ S2} ∪ {(ut′u , d
′(u)) : u ∈ S2}.
We need to show that NI ⊆ EI , i.e., for every (a, b) ∈M , the edge (asa , bsb) is present in GI .
Observe that M̃ and ~α are optimal solutions of (LP1) and (LP2), respectively. It follows
from complementary slackness that αa + αb = wtM (a, b) = 0 for every (a, b) ∈ M . Thus
either αa = αb = 0 or {αa, αb} = {−1, 1}.
For every edge (a, b) in M where αa = αb = 0 (each such edge is in (S0×S0)∪ (S2×S2)),
observe that the edge (a0, b0) is in GI . In particular, if (a, b) ∈ (S2 × S2) ∩M , then we have
Ci = {a, b} for some i ∈ {p+ 1, . . . , q} and we always include the edge (a0, b0) in GI .
Consider an edge (a, b) inM where αa or αb is −1 (each such edge is in (S1×S1)∪(S2×S2)).
Assume wlog that αa = −1. Since ~α is a witness of M , for every neighbor c ∈ S0 of a, we
have wtM (a, c) ≤ αa + αc = −1 + 0 = −1. This means wtM (a, c) = −2, i.e., a prefers its
partner in M (this is b) to c. The constraint wtM (a, c) = −2 holds for every neighbor c of a
that is in S0. Hence it follows from the definition of the edge set of GI that (a−, b+) is in GI .
Thus every edge of NI is present in GI , hence NI is a matching in GI . We will now show
that NI obeys properties (1)-(3) given in the statement of the theorem.
1. For every edge (a, b) ∈M , we have αa+αb = wtM (a, b) = 0 (by complementary slackness).
Thus every edge in NI that is not incident to any dummy vertex is of the type (a+, b−)
or (a0, b0) or (a−, b+). Hence NI avoids all edges between a subscript 0 vertex and a
subscript + vertex.
2. For any vertex u left unmatched in M , we have αu = wtM (u, u) = 0 (by complementary
slackness). So u ∈ S0 ∪ S2. Since every vertex in S2 is matched to its popular partner in
all popular matchings in G, the unmatched vertex u ∈ S0. Thus for every u ∈ (A∪B)\S0,
we have (u, v) ∈ M for some neighbor v: if αu = −1 then (u−, v+) ∈ NI else either
(u−, d(u)) or (u−, d′(u)) is in NI . Thus all subscript − vertices are matched in NI .
3. For every connected component Ci = {a, b} in G0, where p + 1 ≤ i ≤ q, we know that
(a, b) ∈ M . Thus one of (a+, b−), (a0, b0), (a−, b+) is in NI . So NI includes q − p edges
from the set ∪qi=p+1{(a+, b−), (a0, b0), (a−, b+) : a, b ∈ Ci}.
We will now show that NI is a stable matching in GI . For any u ∈ A ∪B, it is easy to
see there is no blocking edge with a dummy vertex as an endpoint. This is because a dummy
vertex has only two neighbors and when it is matched to its second choice neighbor, its top
choice neighbor is matched to a more preferred neighbor.
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Regarding edges in EI that correspond to edges in E, note that EI contains certain edges
of the form (a0, b0), (a+, b0), (a0, b+), (a+, b−), (a−, b+) for (a, b) ∈ E. We now need to show
that no such edge in EI blocks NI . Consider any (a, b) ∈ E.
1. Both a and b are in S0: so αa = αb = 0. We need to show that (a0, b0) is not a blocking
edge to NI . Since wtM (a, b) ≤ αa + αb = 0, either (a, b) ∈M or (at least) one of a, b is
matched in M to a more preferred neighbor. That is, either (a0, b0) ∈ NI or one of a0, b0
is matched in NI to a more preferred neighbor. So (a0, b0) does not block NI .
2. One of a, b is in S0 and the other is in S1: assume wlog that a ∈ S0 and b ∈ S1. So
αa = 0 and αb ∈ {±1}. We need to show that (a0, b+) is not a blocking edge to NI .
There are two subcases here: (i) αb = 1 and (ii) αb = −1.
In the first subcase, wtM (a, b) ≤ αa + αb = 1 which implies wtM (a, b) ≤ 0. So one of a, b
is matched in M to a more preferred neighbor. So one of a0, b+ is matched in NI to a
more preferred neighbor. Hence (a0, b+) does not block NI .
In the second subcase, wtM (a, b) ≤ αa + αb = −1 which implies wtM (a, b) = −2. So both
a and b are matched in M to more preferred neighbors. In particular, a0 is matched in
NI to a neighbor preferred to b+. Hence (a0, b+) does not block NI .
3. Both a and b are in S1: so αa, αb ∈ {±1}. We need to show that the edges (a−, b+) and
(a+, b−) (whichever of these is in EI) do not block NI . If αa = αb = 1 then both a−
and b− are matched to their top choice neighbors d(a) and d(b), respectively. So neither
(a−, b+) nor (a+, b−) blocks NI .
If αa = 1 and αb = −1 then wtM (a, b) ≤ 0. So either (a, b) ∈M or one of a, b is matched
in M to a more preferred neighbor in G. That is, either (a+, b−) ∈ NI or one of a+, b− is
matched in NI to a more preferred neighbor in GI . Moreover, the edge (a−, b+) cannot
block NI since a− is matched in NI to its top choice neighbor d(a). The subcase when
αa = −1 and αb = 1 is symmetric.
The last subcase is αa = αb = −1. So wtM (a, b) = −2. Hence both a and b are matched
in M to more preferred neighbors, i.e., both a− and b− are matched in NI to neighbors
preferred to b+ and a+, respectively. So neither (a−, b+) nor (a+, b−) blocks NI .
The proofs for the remaining three cases (when at least one of a, b is in S2) are given below
in Claims 9-11. Thus NI is a stable matching in GI . J
B Claim 9. Suppose one of a, b (say, b) is in S0 and a is in S2. Then neither (a+, b0) nor
(a0, b0) blocks NI .
Proof. Since a ∈ S2 and b ∈ S0, we have αa ∈ {0,±1} and αb = 0. Suppose αa = −1. Then
wtM (a, b) ≤ −1, i.e., wtM (a, b) = −2. So both a and b are matched in M to more preferred
neighbors. Since M always matches a to its popular partner, it means a prefers its popular
partner to b. Thus (a0, b0) is in EI and b0 is matched in NI to a neighbor preferred to a0.
Suppose αa ∈ {0, 1}. Then wtM (a, b) ≤ 1, i.e., wtM (a, b) ≤ 0. So one of a, b is matched
in M to a more preferred neighbor. Either (i) (a0, b0) is in EI and so a0 is matched in NI to
a more preferred neighbor (its popular partner or d(a)) than b0 or (ii) (a+, b0) is in EI , in
which case a prefers b to its popular partner – so b has to be matched in M to a neighbor
preferred to a, i.e., b0 is matched in NI to a neighbor preferred to a+. Hence neither (a+, b0)
nor (a0, b0) (whichever is present in EI) blocks NI . C
B Claim 10. Suppose one of a, b (say, b) is in S1 and a is in S2. Then neither (a0, b+) nor
(a+, b−) blocks NI .
Proof. Since a ∈ S2 and b ∈ S1, we have αa ∈ {0,±1} and αb ∈ {±1}. Suppose a prefers b
to its popular partner. Then (a0, b+) is in EI and also wtM (a, b) ≥ 0. If αa = 1 then a0 is
matched to its most preferred neighbor d(a) and so (a0, b+) does not block NI . If αa ≤ 0
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then αb = 1 since αa + αb ≥ wtM (a, b) ≥ 0. Also wtM (a, b) ≤ 1 since αa + αb = 1, i.e.,
wtM (a, b) = 0. So b has to be matched in M to a neighbor preferred to a, i.e., b+ has to be
matched in NI to a neighbor preferred to a0. Hence (a0, b+) does not block NI .
Suppose b prefers a to all neighbors in S0. Then (a+, b−) is in EI . If αb = 1 then b−
is matched to its most preferred neighbor d′(b) in NI . Suppose αb = −1. If αa ∈ {0,−1}
then wtM (a, b) ≤ αa + αb ≤ −1. So wtM (a, b) = −2. This means both a, b are matched in
M to more preferred neighbors. Hence b− is matched in NI to a neighbor preferred to a+.
Suppose αa = 1. Then wtM (a, b) ≤ 0: so one of a, b is matched in M to a more preferred
neighbor. So one of a+, b− is matched in NI to a more preferred neighbor. Thus the edge
(a+, b−) does not block NI . C
B Claim 11. Suppose both a and b are in S2. Then none of the edges (a0, b0), (a+, b−), (a−, b+)
blocks NI .
Proof. Since a, b are in S2, we have αa, αb ∈ {0,±1}. If a, b are each other’s popular partners
or one of them prefers the other to its popular partner then the edge (a0, b0) is in EI and also
wtM (a, b) ≥ 0. So either αa = αb = 0 or at least one of αa, αb is 1. So either (a0, b0) ∈ NI or
one of a0, b0 is matched in NI to a more preferred neighbor. Thus (a0, b0) does not block NI .
If a prefers b to all its neighbors in S0 then the edge (a−, b+) is in EI . If αa ∈ {0, 1} then
a− is matched to its most preferred neighbor d′(a) in NI . So the edge (a−, b+) does not block
NI . Suppose αa = −1. If αb ∈ {0,−1} then wtM (a, b) ≤ αa + αb ≤ −1. So wtM (a, b) = −2.
This means both a, b are matched in M to more preferred neighbors. Hence a− is matched
in NI to a neighbor preferred to b+. Suppose αb = 1. Then wtM (a, b) ≤ 0: so one of a, b is
matched in M to a more preferred neighbor. So one of a−, b+ is matched in NI to a more
preferred neighbor. Thus the edge (a−, b+) does not block NI .
The analysis that (a+, b−) does not block NI when b prefers a to all neighbors in S0 is
analogous. C
Let us call a stable matching in GI that satisfies the three properties given in Theorem 8
a desired stable matching. Theorem 12 proves the converse of Theorem 8.
I Theorem 12. Suppose GI admits a desired stable matching, say NI . Then NI can be
mapped to a popular matching M in G such that cost(NI) = cost(M).
Proof. The matching M will be defined as follows:
M = {(a, b) : (asa , bsb) ∈ NI for sa, sb ∈ {0,±}}.
For any u ∈ A ∪B, at most one of u+, u0, u− can be matched to a non-dummy neighbor
in NI . Thus M is a valid matching in G. In order to prove M ’s popularity, we will show
a witness ~α ∈ {0,±1}n. Define αu = 0 for all u ∈ S0. Let u ∈ S1. Since NI is stable, the




−1 if (u+, d(u)) ∈ NI
1 if (u−, d(u)) ∈ NI .
Let u ∈ S2. Then there are two dummy vertices d(u) and d′(u) for u and both of them
(as the top choice neighbors of u0 and u−, resp.) have to be matched in NI . So for u ∈ S2,
define αu as follows:
let αu =

−1 if (u+, d(u)) and (u0, d′(u)) are in NI
0 if (u+, d(u)) and (u−, d′(u)) are in NI
1 if (u0, d(u)) and (u−, d′(u)) are in NI .
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We will now show that ~α is a witness of M ’s popularity. Observe that all edges in NI not
involving any dummy vertex are of the form (a+, b−) or (a0, b0) or (a−, b+). This is because
NI avoids all edges of the type (a+, b0) and (a0, b+) (by property (1)). Thus αa + αb = 0 for
all (a, b) ∈M . Due to property (2), property (3), and NI ’s stability, it follows that for any
vertex u left unmatched in M , we have u ∈ S0, i.e., αu = 0. So
∑
u∈A∪B αu = 0.
It is also easy to see that αu ≥ wtM (u, u) for every vertex u. This is because every vertex
u ∈ (A ∪B) \ S0 is matched in M and so we have αu ≥ −1 = wtM (u, u) for these vertices.
For any vertex u ∈ S0, we have αu = 0 ≥ wtM (u, u).
What is left to show is that every edge (a, b) in G is covered, i.e., αa + αb ≥ wtM (a, b).
This is proved below in Lemma 13. Thus ~α is a witness of M (by Theorem 5). So M is a
popular matching; also cost(M) = cost(NI). This finishes the proof of Theorem 12. J
I Lemma 13. We have αa + αb ≥ wtM (a, b) for every edge (a, b) in G.
Proof. Recall that wtM (a, b) ∈ {0,±2}. Any edge (a, b) where αa = αb = 1 is obviously
covered since wtM (a, b) ≤ 2. The proofs for other cases of (αa, αb) are given in Claims 14-18.
B Claim 14. Any edge (a, b) where {αa, αb} = {0, 1} is covered.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality αa = 1 and αb = 0: so a ∈ S1 ∪ S2 and b ∈ S0 ∪ S2.
If the edge (a+, b0) is in EI then the stability of NI implies that either (i) a+ is matched in
NI to a neighbor preferred to b0 or (ii) b0 is matched in NI to a neighbor preferred to a+
(moreover, a non-dummy neighbor since αb = 0). So at least one of a, b is matched in M to
a more preferred neighbor. Thus wtM (a, b) ≤ 0.
The edge (a+, b0) is not present in GI in the following 2 cases:
1. both a, b are in S2 and either (i) a, b are each other’s popular partners or (ii) at least one
of a, b prefers its popular partner to the other (see footnote 2). By property (3), every
vertex in S2 is matched in M to its popular partner. Hence wtM (a, b) ≤ 0.
2. either (i) a ∈ S2 prefers its popular partner (call it y) to b ∈ S0 or (ii) b ∈ S2 prefers its
popular partner (call it z) to a ∈ S1; property (3) forces (a, y) to be in M in the first
case and (z, b) to be in M in the second case. So wtM (a, b) ≤ 0.
Hence in all cases, we have wtM (a, b) ≤ 0 < 1 = αa + αb. C
B Claim 15. Any edge (a, b) where αa = αb = 0 is covered.
Proof. Since αa = αb = 0, we have a, b ∈ S0 ∪ S2. If the edge (a0, b0) is in GI , then it
follows from the stability of NI that (a0, b0) ∈ NI or one of a0, b0 is matched in NI to a
more preferred (non-dummy) neighbor, i.e., at least one of a, b is matched in M to a more
preferred neighbor. Thus wtM (a, b) ≤ 0.
The edge (a0, b0) is not present in GI in the following 2 cases:
1. a ∈ S2 prefers b ∈ S0 to its popular partner: in this case (a+, b0) is in GI . Since αa = 0,
the vertex a+ is matched in NI to its least preferred neighbor d(a). Thus it follows
from the stability of NI that b0 is matched to a more preferred neighbor than a+, so
wtM (a, b) ≤ 0. It is similar when b ∈ S2 prefers a ∈ S0 to its popular partner.
2. both a, b are in S2 and they prefer their respective popular partners to each other: in
this case wtM (a, b) = −2.
Hence in all cases, we have wtM (a, b) ≤ 0 = αa + αb. C
B Claim 16. Any edge (a, b) where {αa, αb} = {−1, 1} is covered.
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Proof. Assume without loss of generality that αa = 1 and αb = −1. We need to show that
wtM (a, b) ≤ 0. Either (i) (a+, b−) ∈ NI or (ii) (a+, y−) and (z+, b−) are in NI for some
neighbors y, z of a, b, respectively. In case (i), wtM (a, b) = 0. In case (ii), we will consider 2
subcases.
1. Suppose a, b ∈ S1 or a, b ∈ S2 or a ∈ S2 and b ∈ S1. Since the edge (z+, b−) is in GI , b
prefers z to all its neighbors in S0. Hence if b prefers a to z then the edge (a+, b−) has
to be present in GI . It follows from the stability of NI that a+ prefers y− to b−, i.e., a
prefers y to b. Hence wtM (a, b) ≤ 0.
2. The remaining case is when a ∈ S1 and b ∈ S2. So z is b’s popular partner. If b prefers a
to z then the edge (a+, b0) is present in GI . Since b0 is matched to its least preferred
neighbor d′(b) in NI , the stability of NI implies that a+ prefers y− to b0, i.e., a prefers y
to b. Hence wtM (a, b) ≤ 0.
Hence in all cases, we have wtM (a, b) ≤ 0 = αa + αb. C
B Claim 17. Any edge (a, b) where αa = αb = −1 is covered.
Proof. So (a−, y+) and (z+, b−) are in NI for some neighbors y, z of a, b, respectively. There
are 3 cases here:
1. Both a and b are in S1. Suppose a prefers b to y. Then the edge (a−, b+) is present in
GI since a prefers y (and thus b) to all neighbors in S0; moreover, b+ prefers a− to d(b).
Hence (a−, b+) would be a blocking edge to NI , contradicting its stability. So a prefers y
to b. Similarly, b prefers z to a. Thus wtM (a, b) = −2.
2. Both a and b are in S2. Either both a and b prefer their popular partners (y and z, resp.)
to each other or the edge (a0, b0) is in GI . In the latter case, (a0, b0) would be blocking
edge to NI since NI contains (a0, d′(a)) and (b0, d′(b)). Thus both a and b prefer their
popular partners to each other, so wtM (a, b) = −2.
3. One of a, b is in S2 and the other is in S1: assume wlog that a ∈ S2 and b ∈ S1. We claim
that b prefers z to a. Otherwise the edge (a+, b−) would be in GI since b prefers z (and
thus a) to all neighbors in S0. Note that (a+, b−) would block NI since (a+, d(a)) ∈ NI .
We next claim that a prefers y to b. Otherwise the edge (a0, b+) would be in GI and this
would be a blocking edge to NI since (a0, d′(a)) and (b+, d(b)) are in NI . Thus both a
and b prefer their partners in M to each other, so wtM (a, b) = −2.
Hence in all cases, we have wtM (a, b) = −2 = αa + αb. C
B Claim 18. Any edge (a, b) where {αa, αb} = {−1, 0} is covered.
Proof. Assume wlog αa = −1 and αb = 0. So (a−, y+) ∈ NI for some neighbor y of a. Also
(a+, d(a)) ∈ NI . Observe that b0 has to be matched in NI , otherwise one of (a+, b0), (a0, b0)
– whichever is present in GI – would be a blocking edge to NI . So (z0, b0) is in NI for some
neighbor z of b.
If the edge (a+, b0) is present in EI then it follows from the stability of NI that b0 prefers
z0 to a+, i.e., b prefers z to a. Moreover, it follows from the existence of the edge (a−, y+) in
EI that a prefers y to all its neighbors in S0, i.e., a prefers y to b if b ∈ S0. If b ∈ S2 and a
prefers b to y then a prefers b to all neighbors in S0 and so the edge (a−, b+) would have
been present in EI . This would have been a blocking edge to NI since a− prefers b+ to y+
and b+ prefers a− to d(b). Thus a prefers y to b and so wtM (a, b) = −2.
The cases when (a+, b0) is not present in GI are the following:
1. Both a, b are in S2: there are two subcases here. In the first subcase, both a and b prefer
their popular partners to each other and so wtM (a, b) = −2. In the second subcase, one
of a, b prefers the other to its popular partner. Then the edge (a0, b0) is in EI and the
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stability of NI implies that b0 prefers z0 to a0 since (a0, d′(a)) ∈ NI . Thus b prefers z
to a. This means that a prefers b to y and the edge (a−, b+) has to be in EI since a
prefers y (and thus b) to all neighbors in S0. This makes (a−, b+) a blocking edge to
NI , a contradiction. Hence both a, b prefer their popular partners to each other, i.e., the
second subcase does not arise. Thus wtM (a, b) = −2.
2. b ∈ S2 prefers its popular partner to a ∈ S1: so b prefers z to a and we have to argue
that a prefers y to b. Suppose not, i.e., a prefers b to y. Since the edge (a−, y+) is in EI ,
a prefers y (and thus b) to all neighbors in S0. So the edge (a−, b+) is in EI and this
is a blocking edge to NI since (b+, d(b)) and (a−, y+) are in NI . This contradicts NI ’s
stability, hence a prefers y to b. Thus wtM (a, b) = −2.
3. a ∈ S2 prefers its popular partner to b ∈ S0: so a prefers y to b. Then the edge (a0, b0)
is in GI . Since a0 is matched to its least preferred neighbor d′(a), it follows from the
stability of NI that b0 prefers z0 to a0, i.e., b prefers z to a. Thus wtM (a, b) = −2.
Hence in all cases, we have wtM (a, b) = −2 < −1 = αa + αb. C
This finishes the proof of Lemma 13. J
Finding a min-cost desired stable matching in GI . We first check that all subscript −
vertices are stable in GI . This is easily done by running Gale-Shapley algorithm in GI
and using the fact that all stable matchings leave the same vertices unmatched [15]. This
ensures property (2). Then we solve a min-cost stable matching problem in GI with forbidden
edges. There are two types of forbidden edges here: the first type are all edges between a
subscript + vertex and a subscript 0 vertex in GI . Forbidding these edges ensures property (1).
The second type of forbidden edges are described below. Forbidding these edges ensures
property (3).
Ensuring property (3). For any u ∈ S2, all edges incident to any vertex u+, u0, u− are
marked forbidden except for the following edges, where v is u’s popular partner:
the edges among (u+, v−), (u0, v0), (u−, v+) that are in EI ;
the pair of edges (u+, d(u)), (u0, d(u)) and the pair of edges (u0, d′(u)), (u−, d′(u)).
For u ∈ S2, every stable matching in GI has to match u+, u0, d(u), d′(u) since these
are top choice neighbors for some vertices. Moreover, we have already checked that all
subscript − vertices are stable in GI . Thus all the five vertices u+, u0, u−, d(u), d′(u) have
to be matched in every stable matching in GI . In particular, two of u+, u0, u− are matched
to d(u), d′(u). Thus any stable matching in GI that avoids forbidden edges of the second
type has to contain one of (u+, v−), (u0, v0), (u−, v+).
Desired stable matchings. We have seen that all stable matchings of GI that satisfy the 3
properties given in Theorem 8 are precisely those stable matchings in GI that avoid edges that
we marked forbidden. Consider the stable matching polytope S of GI : we know that xe ≥ 0
for any edge e is a valid inequality for S, hence the intersection of S with the constraints
xe = 0 for every forbidden edge e is a face F of S. Since F is an integral polytope and
every integral point in F is a stable matching in GI that avoids forbidden edges, NI can be
computed in polynomial time by linear programming over the constraints defining F . These
are the constraints of the stable matching polytope S along with the constraints xe = 0 for
every forbidden edge e. A min-cost desired stable matching NI over all I ⊆ [p] maps to a
min-cost popular matching in G (by Theorem 8 and Theorem 12).
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As mentioned earlier, the popular subgraph G0 can be constructed in linear time [7].
Then we identify the connected components C1, . . . , Cp of size at least 4 in G0. The number
of sets I that we need to go through is 2p, thus our algorithm runs in 2p · poly(n) time. Since
p ≤ n/4, this proves Theorem 2 stated in Section 1.
4 Semi-popular matchings
In this section we consider the problem of computing an almost semi-popular matching of
cost at most 2opt. Our input is a bipartite graph G = (A ∪B,E) where vertices have strict
preferences and we have cost : E → R≥0. We are also given a parameter ε ∈ (0, 1/2).
Popular fractional matchings. The notion of popularity can be extended to fractional
matchings. A vector ~x ∈ R|E|≥0 that satisfies
∑
e∈δ(u) xe ≤ 1 for all vertices u is a fractional
matching in G. The fractional matching ~x is popular if ∆(~x,N) ≥ 0 for all matchings N ,
where ∆(~x,N) is defined as follows: ~x is a convex combination of matchings (Birkhoff-von
Neumann theorem), so ~x =
∑
i piIMi for some matchings Mi where
∑
i pi = 1, each pi ≥ 0,
and ∆(~x,N) is defined as
∑
i pi ·∆(Mi, N). Since the fractional matching ~x can possibly
be expressed in multiple ways as convex combinations of matchings, ∆(~x,N) may seem
ill-defined. However this is well-defined and we refer to [26, Lemma 1] for details.
Let opt∗ be the cost of a min-cost popular fractional matching in G and let ~q be a min-cost
popular fractional matching. The fractional matching ~q can be efficiently computed [26]. We
have cost(~q) = opt∗ ≤ opt where opt is the cost of a min-cost popular matching.
It was shown in [20] that the popular fractional matching polytope is half-integral. Thus
we can assume that ~q is half-integral. So ~q = (IM1 + IM2)/2 where M1 and M2 are two
matchings in G. We know that ∆(~q,N) ≥ 0 for all matchings N in G.
I Observation 3. There is a matching M ∈ {M1,M2} such that M is semi-popular.
Proof. Since ∆(~q,N) = (∆(M1, N) + ∆(M2, N))/2 and ∆(~q,N) ≥ 0 for every matching N ,
we have either ∆(M1, N) ≥ 0 or ∆(M2, N) ≥ 0 for every matching N . Hence one of M1,M2
is undefeated by at least half the matchings in G. C
Since all edge costs are non-negative and cost(~q) = (cost(M1) + cost(M2))/2, we have
cost(M1) ≤ 2 · cost(~q) and cost(M2) ≤ 2 · cost(~q). So there is M ∈ {M1,M2} such that (i) M
is semi-popular and (ii) cost(M) ≤ 2opt.
The problem here is to efficiently decide which of M1,M2 is semi-popular. We do not
know how to answer this question exactly. However we can decide with high probability
whether both M1 and M2 are close to being semi-popular or one of them is not - in which
case the other matching has to be semi-popular (by Observation 3). Here we will use the
classical result from [22] that shows a polynomial time algorithm to sample matchings from
a distribution that is close to the uniform distribution in total variation distance (see [22,
Corollary 4.3]).
The input is G = (A∪B,E) with non-negative edge costs and ε ∈ (0, 1/2). Our algorithm
is as follows:
1. Compute a min-cost popular half-integral matching ~q in G. Let ~q = (IM1 + IM2)/2 where
M1 and M2 are matchings in G.
2. Produce a sample S of s = 64 · d(lnn)/ε2e matchings from a distribution that is ε/4-close
to the uniform distribution (on all matchings in G) in total variation distance.
3. If both M1 and M2 are undefeated by more than s · (1 − ε)/2 of matchings in S then
return the matching in {M1,M2} with lower cost.
4. Else return the matching in {M1,M2} undefeated by a majority of matchings in S.
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In Step 2, we use the random sampler in [22] that constructs the sample S in poly(n, 1ε )
time. It is easy to see that the running time of our algorithm is poly(n, 1ε ). Lemma 19 and
Lemma 20 bound the probability that our algorithm makes an error.
I Lemma 19. Suppose M ∈ {M1,M2} is defeated by more than 1/2 + ε fraction of all
matchings in G. Then our algorithm returns M in step 3 with probability at most 1/n.
Proof. Since M is defeated by more than 1/2 + ε fraction of all matchings in G, the expected
number of matchings that defeat M from a set of s matchings, where each matching is chosen
uniformly at random from the set of all matchings in G is more than s · (1/2 + ε). The set S
is formed by sampling s matchings from a distribution ε/4-close to the uniform distribution
in total variation distance. Hence the expected number of matchings from S that defeat M
is more than s · (1/2 + ε− ε/4) = s · (2 + 3ε)/4.
If M was returned in step 3 then M was undefeated by more than s · (1− ε)/2 matchings
from S. Equivalently, less than s · (1 + ε)/2 matchings from S defeated M . By Chernoff
bound, the probability of this event is at most exp(−s ·ε2/(16+24ε)). Since s ≥ 64 · (lnn)/ε2,
this probability is at most 1/n. J
The next lemma bounds the error when our algorithm reaches step 4.
I Lemma 20. Suppose M ∈ {M1,M2} is not semi-popular. Then our algorithm returns M
in step 4 with probability at most 1/n.
Proof. Since M is defeated by more than half the matchings in G, the expected number of
matchings that defeat M from a set of s matchings, where each matching is chosen uniformly
at random from the set of all matchings in G, is more than s/2. Since the set S is formed
by sampling s matchings from a distribution ε/4-close to the uniform distribution in total
variation distance, the expected number of matchings that defeat N from S is more than
s · (2− ε)/4.
The algorithm reached step 4 and M was the matching that was undefeated by a majority
of matchings in S. Observe that M defeated more than s · (1 + ε)/2 matchings in the set S.
This is because the matching in {M1,M2} \ {M} was defeated by more than s · (1 + ε)/2
matchings in S – otherwise we would not have reached step 4. Since M defeats more than
s(1+ε)/2 matchings from S, less than s(1−ε)/2 matchings from S defeated M . By Chernoff
bound, the probability of this event is at most exp(−s ·ε2/(64−32ε)). Since s ≥ 64 ·(lnn)/ε2,
this probability is at most 1/n. J
Lemma 19 and Lemma 20 bound the error probability of our algorithm. Thus we have
proved Theorem 4 stated in Section 1.
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